Introduction
Since the enactment of economic liberalization measures in India since the early 1990s, there has been an increased participation of the private sector in the Indian economy 1 . The conventional stance in the literature on business attitudes toward liberalization generally emphasizes the importance of capital friendly attitude such as investment incentives, including flexible labor market to meet the challenges of global competition and a changing production system. The pressure for business friendly policies and factors market flexibility is enhanced -under conditions of increased economic globalization-due to the competitive pressures for attracting investments and greater policy space to business actors.
One of the observed outcomes of economic liberalization in India has been increasing divergence in economic performance often attributed to variation in investment climate and labor market flexibility across different states in India. 2 From the perspective of increased economic liberalization in transition economies, it would be plausible to link the demand for business 1 friendly policies including labor market flexibility with an increasing relevance of business in policy making, particularly if we view business as an interest group. 3 As such, the choice of business groups as the explanatory variable would be a good starting point given its centrality in the context of economic globalization. 4 Although there is merit to such an argument, this article argues that the influence of business on policy is determined by wider political dynamics. Using case studies from India, we argue that the presence of business in the social base of political parties, including the influence of caste on partisan orientation, has an influence in the policy process, specifically as it pertains to labor market flexibility. As the case study of subnational variation in investment incentives suggests, business influence is conditioned by the relation between business and the political party in government, which in turn is determined by the representation of business interests within parties. To put it simply, reforms understood through investment friendly policies and labor flexibility does not correspond to the size of the private sector (i.e., the material resources of business groups), but to the position of business classes and caste-based groups within the support base of political parties. We shall show that caste identification plays an important role on the position of political parties towards business liberalization policies. Such an outcome reflects the continued importance of partisan orientation in mediating public policies under conditions of globalization.
This article is arranged as follows. The first section deals with the broad theoretical terms, namely the dynamics of business and politics in the context of globalization. Section two elaborates on the business-policy dynamics with specific reference to India, which is followed by 3 Furlong 1997; Heinz et al. 1993; Spiller 1990; Yackee and Yackee 2006. 4 Hall and Soskice 2001; Held 1999 .
the methodology and framework of analysis developed in section three. Section four presents the analysis based on a mixture of quantitative data and qualitative interviews of business actors across the four cases. Finally the conclusion presents the main findings through a historicalinstitutional understanding of the relative variation in business influence over government due to partisan orientation.
Globalization and Business
Globalization has been argued to be a beneficial process for capital or business since it strengthens the dominance of the market economy, constricts the role of the state, and expands the influence of transnational corporations. 5 The increased economic inter-relation between states, global economic and technological changes along with the ideational reorientation has increased the scope of business relative to other social groups within societies. Theoretically, the process of globalization increases the political power of business relative to other social groups as well as the state through increased concentration of economic power, access to policy makers and threat of capital flight. Evidence suggests that bargaining between business and other social groups has been altered under conditions of globalization and scholars have often pointed out increasing policy relevance of -government-business‖ coalition which incorporates the role of business interests in the policy-making process. 6 Furthermore, some argue that the process of globalization erodes the powers and the functions of the state. In this setting, multinational corporations can bargain favorably in relation to the state. 
Business and Public Policies
Within the context of liberalization, private sector firms in reforming economies generally favor greater flexibility as competitive market economy requires adjusting the factor of production in accordance with market signals. As Martin and Swank point out, private sector firms resist any policies that interfere with their profitability by increasing tax burdens, or raising the wage floor of collective bargaining, or interfere with managerial control. 10 In turn, strict labor regulations and trade unions often pose impediments to such profitability and market corrections.
Although the necessity of some social regulation is accepted, it is argued that restrictive provisions have a negative effect on growth of business. 11 Increasing integration from trade and deregulation further creates competitive pressures on business to reduce costs by accessing concessions from the state and increasing flexibility. In short, globalization increases the pressure for internal liberalization and labor market flexibility.
In the context of India, the adoption of a market-led development strategy has increasingly led to structural pressures for business friendly policies and labor market flexibility.
India -like other most transition economies-has a small industrial sector with an overwhelming dependence on the agricultural and the service sectors. As a labor surplus and capital scarce economy in contemporary global system, the state is under pressure to provide 10 Martin and Swank 2004.
11 Fallon and Lucas 1993; Besley and Burgess 2004. incentives to capital for investment. Such a developmental model is reinforced by the proliferation of trade and investment regimes leading to creation of certain global norms based on a liberal market model. This is reflected in the repeated concerns from governments -as well as business organizations-about institutional impediments, such as complex labor laws and bureaucratic control in attracting investments and encouraging economic growth. As such, it can be assumed that a large private sector would significantly increase the pressures for investment friendly policies and labor market flexibility due to a mixture of economic reasons.
However, we suggest that the capacity of business to influence public policy as an interest group is not conditioned by economic considerations alone. The literature on interest group influence suggests that in democracies the power of any interest group is significantly determined by wider political dynamics, such as countervailing interests in society, linkages to government and so on. 12 Accordingly, we argue that industrial and labor policy are not merely structurally determined by the size of the private sector or by employer coordination, but also by the interaction of relevant social economic interests within the wider political process. Using the case of India, we will show that the caste identification of policy-makers shapes their predisposition to business-friendly policies. We will evaluate the role of business as a sociopolitical actor in a wider political matrix, especially in India, a country characterized by the historical weakness of economic interest groups and by a legacy of state presence in economic policy making. Since the objective of this article is to determine the role of business interests in policy reforms, implicitly it is recognized that policy is not structurally determined by capital.
Moreover, as the case study is based on sub-national comparison of structurally and institutionally similar units, the role of political institutions in policy can be argued to similar, if operational.
Determining business power in India
Empirical research on business-politics is confounded by the problem of identifying the mechanisms and sources of business influence. Business influence on policy may operate on an 16 Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Garrett 1998. 17 Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Jenkins 2004. individual as well as on a collective level, both manifestly and latently. Moreover, the effectiveness of business influence over policy is also determined by the type of policy at stake.
The three major categories of public policy -distribution, regulation, and redistribution-tends to develop their own characteristic political structure, political process and group relations.
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The power of business emanates from its control over capital and consequently the forces of production. As explained earlier, modern governments everywhere for reasons of legitimacy have to ensure constant economic growth and, accordingly, must provide rewards to business to help foster that growth. Consequently, we can argue that that if the productive resources (e.g., capital, technology, industries) are under greater control of the government, then business is relatively marginalized. Therefore, the extent of public-private ownership of firms in an economy should provide some understanding of business power.
Expanding on the argument further, theoretically, economic reform should increase the political power of business class vis-à-vis the state. Similarly, in terms of foreign direct investment, the fact that multinational firms have become critical drivers of technological innovation, learning, and economic growth affords them a very -privileged position‖ in domestic policy. Thus, the increasing concentration of foreign investment as well as private capital should greatly expand the power of business under globalization. The objective of this article is to determine the sources of business influence that corroborate extent of reform specifically investment incentives and labor market flexibility in the selected states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and West Bengal.
The specific case studies employed in this article have been selected for the purpose of investigating the relation between business presence and labor market reform. We compare 18 Godbole 2004. institutionally and structurally similar political units with variations in labor market flexibility.
In order to minimize state specific economic differences that may have an impact on labor market flexibility, the specific case studies of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and West
Bengal mirror the cases selected in previous cutting-edge research on state-business relations in India. 19 These four states are advanced industrialized states employing the largest number of workers in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the industrial structure of the selected states, along with their respective growth rates and contribution of industry to net state domestic product, provides an important comparative dimension, as such they provide the most concrete example of variation in labor market flexibility.
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Hence in order to compare the relative position of business across the states in India, we evaluate the data on the contribution of industry to the net state domestic product (NSDP), the share of public-private ownership of firms in the economy. We also measure the extent of FDI as proxy variables for material resources at the disposal of business. Further, data on the number of export oriented firms in the economy is also considered due to their privileged position as foreign exchange earner as well as to account for the differences in business orientation based on nature of industry.
Material resources of business in India
Any attempt to decipher potential influence of business in India should begin with an assessment of resources at their disposal. At the macrolevel, the control over economic resources 19 Sinha 2005 . 
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In terms of resources at the disposal of business, a greater share of public sector would imply lower business influence, not only on government, but also on the overall economy. As it 21 Iarossi et al. 2009 . is difficult to get comprehensive state level data on the distribution between public and private sources of capital, instead we examine the data on employment share in public-private sector.
The underlying logic for the selection of such a proxy variables remains that importance of business stems from both industrial investment and employment generation. As such greater levels of employment in the private sector would indicate greater leverage for the business sector. Figure It is clear from the data presented so far that business (i.e., the private sector) contributes relatively more to NSDP and factory employment in Gujarat and Maharashtra while their contribution in terms of NSDP is lower in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. An intuitive reading of these data suggests that the environment for investment in industry in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh is thriving. Such an interpretation corresponds with a number of studies that summarize and compare the investment climate in Indian states. 22 In order to determine the exact nature of the relationship between industry and business, it is necessary to look into the business-government dynamics at sub-national states from a historical perspective. 22 Iarossi et al 2009.
A final element to consider in identifying business strength is the variation in the impact of investment (including foreign direct investment) in the four case studies selected here. Table 2 shows that there is an anomaly in the rank order of states.
Maharashtra has greater industrial sector contribution to NSDP and greater private sector employment than Andhra Pradesh. However, Andhra Pradesh has greater labor market flexibility than Maharashtra [See Table 2] [ 
The extent of business organization
An important factor that may account for the divergence in the degree of business influence over state polices pertains to business influence over policy makers. In a democracy, translate into influence and points out the role of broader political processes particularly coherence in interest aggregation and business-party linkage.
Partisan orientation: business -party linkage
A conventional explanation regarding the subnational variation in investment incentives and labor market flexibility emphasizes on the nature of government. 30 The relation between business and government policy is not straightforward and just as greater business contribution should lead to influence of business, business decision to invest is influenced by government policies. Alvarez et al point out that ab initio expectations about labor and government may affect business strategy as capitalists may be less likely to invest in domestic economy when it confronts a strong labor movement and a leftist government. 31 Naturally the nature of party in power has implications for the nature of business-party linkage. Although this theme could be elaborated further, here we will present some preliminary findings on the issue of business-party linkages in our four Indian states.
According to the literature on partisanship (i.e., the ideological orientation of government in terms of a left to right spectrum), economic programs have a significant relationship to macroeconomic characteristics. These include employment levels, monetary growth rates, income distributions, growth strategies, and growth rates. 32 We argue that such differences in the programmatic orientation of parties in India emanate from the differences in the social support 30 Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991, Sinha 2005 . 31 Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991. 32 Quinn and Shapiro 1991. 
Case study 1: Andhra Pradesh
According to literature industrialization in Andhra Pradesh occurred mainly under the auspices of the state under economic planning and until 1970s the regional elite of the state were not keen on industrialization which has been attributed to their association with land. As Alivelu et al point out it was only after the green revolution, particularly in the fertile region of the state that one finds the emergence of an agriculture turned industrial class along with an urban educated middle class. Such a development marked the emergence of a regional business class and increasing participation of private sector in the economy. Table 3 shows the Reddi, Kamma, and (to a lesser extent) Kapu constitute the dominant caste groups within the state (S.C and S.T seats are constitutionally reserved) and tend to be represented by the two major political parties [See Table 3 ].
37 Kohli and Bardhan 1988 . 38 Suri 2004.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] Table 3 A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between political party affiliation and caste in Andhra Pradesh. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (28, N = 272) = 97.57, p <.01. As such business groups in Andhra Pradesh by virtue of their dominance in the support base of major parties can be argued to have greater influence over public policy. The relatively greater labor market flexibility in the state despite lower business resources seems to be explained by this greater political influence of business.
The situation in Andhra Pradesh suggests that competing business castes constitute important support base for competing political parties. In terms of inter-party difference in support base, the Congress Party has relatively heterogeneous support base compared to the TDP.
Case study 2: Gujarat
Detecting partisan orientation in the context of labor market reforms in Gujarat is difficult as the material resources of business already suggest a dominant role for business.
However, an historical overview reveals that Gujarat has been characterized by the political dominance of the regional bourgeoisie, which can be traced even before liberalization.
According to Sinha, a class of capitalist farmers who later turned into industrial class (Patidar Patel), the artisan -trader (Bania) class and the backward castes constitute the regional bourgeoisie in the state. 39 This regional business class developed and gained in strength -even during the stage of Nehruvian economic planning-due to conscious policy choice of regional political elites. In fact the greater share of private sector and relative lack of public sector investments was a conscious policy to strengthen the business classes by ensuring larger share of the economy.
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Since the mid-1980s, after a brief period of political turmoil, the state has witnessed a stable two party competition between Congress Party and the BJP. Given the reformist economic orientation of the BJP and continuous BJP rule in the state since 1990s the increasing labor market flexibility in the state is quite expected. However, it is interesting to note that labor flexibility appears to have increased even prior to economic liberalization. This outcome can be attributed to the hegemonic dominance of business castes in the politics of the state.
The dominance of Patidar-Bania-Brahmin caste alliance has meant that irrespective of political parties, the developmental orientation of the state has always incorporated business interests. The point becomes clear if we consider the data on the dominant caste composition of the elected members of parliament in the state. [See A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between political party affiliation and caste in Gujarat. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (14, N = 176) = 58.1, p <.01. Just as was the case with respect to the impact of caste groups in Andhra Pradesh, we show that caste identification and political representation are not statistically independent. We have shown that business caste groups are dominant within the Congress and the BJP, the two more dominant parties in the state. The case study of Gujarat affirms partisan orientation in terms of business domination. However specific to Gujarat, the linkage between business and politics transcends partisan divisions as business influence seems endure political alteration.
Case study 3: Maharashtra
Among the cases being evaluated in this study, Maharashtra is the most interesting case as it is the state has been historically one of the frontrunners in terms of economic growth and industrial development. Given the large and vibrant industrial sector in the state business should have been comparatively more influential in bringing about greater labor flexibility. However, as we showed earlier, Maharashtra is marked by comparatively lower labor market flexibility; lower than Andhra Pradesh, for instance. Although business constitutes an important and powerful social group in the state, it has not emerged as a hegemonic group as it has been the case in Gujarat. However, the material interests of the brahmins (predominantly regional bourgeoisie-industrial and urban middle class) have also been preserved by the government through an elaborate patronage network.
The argument can be elaborated through the data on the dominant caste composition of the elected members of parliament in the state of Maharashtra. As is evident from the data, the agrarian caste of Maratha-Kunbi dominates politics in the state in an overwhelming manner and consequently business interests although powerful is not hegemonic. In terms of partisan variation in support base between the two major political alliance blocks namely Congress-NCP and BJP-Shiv Sena it is evident that the support base of the former is relatively more 41 Palshikar and Deshpande 1999.
heterogeneous with greater representation of scheduled castes and marginalized communities.
[See Table 5] [ The article has offered an important explanation to account for the variation in labor market flexibility across subnational states in India. As an explanatory variable we show the relevance of political and social dynamics. We have shown the relevance of such political and social dynamics through a comparative case study of most like cases. Using four case studies in India, we have shown that variation in labor market flexibility stems from the presence or absence of business castes within the government. As such, the article is not about the processes through which business groups influence labor policies, but rather by establishing the relation between the presence/absence of business groups and labor reform. Our sub-national analysis of business representation suggests that the existence of assertive and dominant business caste-class within the major parties in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat have led to greater pro-business orientation. In contrast, the near complete absence of business classes in the politics of West
Bengal has meant marginal influence of business in public policy. However, as the situation in Maharashtra reveals, the mere presence of business interests within political parties is not a sufficient condition to guarantee adequate business influence. Rather the ability of business castes-classes to emerge as a dominant support base (i.e., electorally relevant constituency) is crucial for business influence.
The analysis of business presence in support base of political parties (i.e., the partisan representation across states) reveals some important dimension of business politics linkages across the states of India. The relevance of contending social groups in determining business influence and attitude may be identified from the difference in business attitude reflected across the states. For example, in terms of labor market flexibility, policy outcomes emphasize socioeconomic equality, often recognizing the adverse effect of liberalization of labor. Business in West Bengal and Maharashtra although strongly endorsing labor flexibility for attracting investment and efficiency seem to approach the issue at a social level. In contrast, the approach of business towards questions of flexibility in Andhra Pradesh and particularly Gujarat resembled the classic neoliberal paradigm where much more faith appears to be on operation of market and its beneficial impact. As a result of the impact of business caste elites in the national parliament, most policy in Gujarat emphasizes on the benefits of growth reflected through enlightened interaction between business and labor that resulted in very low confrontation. In
Gujarat, businesses have shown a preferred individual interaction with labor with relative marginalization of organized labor.
Our article suggests that parties tend to cater to business interest in labor policies more whenever there is greater representation of business in politics. Our argument is based on the analytical classification of the electoral base of political parties and the dominant base within parties. We have argued that in terms of policy orientation, the interests of the dominant base have greater leverage than that of the electoral base. To support this claim, we have measured the composition of elected members of parliament (e.g., the leadership) in terms of profession and caste composition.
We think that the argument of partisan orientation can be theoretically substantiated as interest groups in India have developed along pluralist lines and were often divided along nature of capital, regional concentration, and even caste. The post-independence legacy of dirigisme had meant that the influence of interest groups dependent on their capacity to influence parties in government and electoral outcomes. As such the relevance of business within electoral support base for parties emerged as critical to determine its influence. Labor market reform is ideally determined through an interaction of business, labor, and the state. Given the state-dominated institutional structure that has evolved in the four decades after India's independence, the state has a crucial role in determining the outcome of the negotiations between labor and capital. As we have shown, then business has greater leverage over the state legislature, there is greater labor market flexibility. This argument can be extended to claim that the power of organized labor to prevent labor market reforms is contingent upon its own capacity to mobilize as well as its capacity to influence the state.
The principal finding developed in this article challenges the conventional notion of variegated business influence across subnational states by highlighting the role of caste in explaining variations in policy. The relative power of business across the states appears to vary due to the relation between business and government which in turn is structured by the salience of business castes as an electorally relevant group. States where business castes form support base for parties and has access to decision makers are the ones characterized by greater labor flexibility. As such the partisan orientation hypothesis appears to be most relevant explanation for variations in business influence. However, the exact relation between the presence of business castes as a support base and the extent of its influence is contingent upon the composition of broader socio-economic support base for the regime should be explored in further research.
